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The recent video showing a young Syrian boy rescued from rubble after airstrikes in Aleppo has again
highlighted the scale of violence in the Syrian civil war. Here, Brett Edwards and Mattia Cacciatori
outline the current state of affairs regarding chemical weapons attacks in the country, and the best
way that UK Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson can support the legal and criminal investigations into
these attacks.
Last month, one of Boris Johnson’s first tasks as Foreign Secretary was to vote through a British
motion at the UN Security Council which will see the destruction of the remnants of Libya’s chemical
weapon programme.  He stated:
‘In doing so, we have reduced the risk of these weapons falling into the hands of terrorists
and fanatics……Together, we have shown our collective commitment to the people and
authorities of Libya, and, ultimately, to all of us who want to live in a world free from
chemical weapons.’
The Libyan situation currently feels far removed from the ongoing Syrian crisis, where, so terrible are ongoing war-
crimes that international responses to chemical weapon use have even been framed as a distraction from broader
state sanctioned atrocities and UN impotence.
More depressing still, chemical weapon attacks have continued since Syria’s shotgun wedding to the Organization
for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapon (OPCW) regime, which followed the Ghouta chemical weapon attacks of
2013. This membership, based on a US-Russia led agreement, saw Syria stripped of its capabilities to produce
mustard and nerve agent weapons – but chlorine gas use has continued since the agreement, with well over 100 
accusations acknowledged by the OPCW since Syria joined. This month saw further deaths linked to chlorine
attacks, in Allepo and Idlib.
The regime is also prime suspect in many of these reported attacks; yet any progress on this issue has been
hamstringed by broader political concerns time and time again. Clearly then, international action on chemical
weapons (supposedly a universal concern) makes for a far from perfect poster-child for international co-operation
over Syria, reflecting the hypocrisy and stunning duplicity which has been exhibited in a conflict which will likely kill
thousands more before stability is regained.
Pursuit of criminal justice for these specific crimes is seen at best a secondary contemporary priority, and at worst a
distraction from more pressing issues – such as the humanitarian disaster which continues in Aleppo, as Russia
and Syria intensify bombing – 300,000 civilians are under siege and the consequences of the continued
bombardment have been sickening; so terrible in fact that most of the world appears to have stopped watching.
However, criminal prosecution for chemical weapon use still needs to be considered now, not only because it is right,
but also because it will likely be given increased importance in later stages of any peace process – and this is
something that the UK needs to support.
Mr Johnson supported the failed government proposal for UK military action against the Assad regime back in the
summer of 2013. There were a wide range of reasons that MPs backed the government on that vote, including the
need to protect the chemical weapon norm, to punish the regime, as well as the need for regime change. But these
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justifications didn’t fit neatly into the narrow humanitarian intervention narrative crafted by the Prime Minister, David
Cameron. Indeed, this ambiguity actually lent purchase to the arguments of those who questioned the rationale for
action as well as the ulterior motives of the government. In particular, it was clear that many MPs felt that the
government should work through the UN system; this was despite the ongoing deadlock over Syria in the Security
Council. As one MP noted:
‘We should send a message to President Assad, if we are convinced that he and his regime are
responsible for the chemical attacks, to say, “Identify those who are responsible. Make them come
before the criminal courts,” so that they can be punished in the best way possible, through due
process of law.’
It was obvious even at the point however that Russia would seek to block UN Security Council referral of Syria  to
the International Criminal Court (ICC), the only route through which an ICC investigation could be launched. And
veto they did, along with China, in May 2014. Despite this situation, there have been continued calls for an ICC
referral, something which seems unlikely while Assad is a sitting head of state. This, coupled with the fact that the
current UN and OPCW Joint Investigation into culpability for chemical weapon use in Syria excludes the largest and
most well-documented attack in Ghouta which killed hundreds and injured thousands, reminds us of the centrality of
state interests in the interpretation and execution of international law; as well as the way in which states navigate
the landscape of international institutions.
However, Syrian membership to the OPCW should not be seen as entirely antithetical to the pursuit of justice. The
Joint Investigation is currently investigating 9 out of at least 116 chemical weapon allegations of which it is aware at
the time of writing – which occurred between April 2014 and August 2015. Nobody is suggesting this process is
perfect – but it is building an evidence base for future trials which we would not otherwise have.
At the end of September the UN- OPCW Joint Investigation team will reach the end of its current official mandate.
This has been a closed process and so there have been no provisional findings released. However, it seems
unlikely that this team will be in a position to present findings about culpability as conclusive. Indeed, progress
reports released so far have not been optimistic in tone. Yet it has, we must remember, operated not only in the
context of negotiated limitations, but also the realities of investigating politically sensitive issues which have occurred
in a conflict zone.
Any absence of smoking guns and accusations in the final report will undoubtedly be interpreted as further evidence
of how our governments and international institutions continue to fail Syrians. This is certainly the case. However,
this international channel of evidence gathering is currently unparalleled in relation to the Syrian conflict – in terms of
its mandate to gather evidence and attribute responsibilities for war crimes. Mr Johnson should remember this and
continue to lend the various forms of support that the UK can offer. This will likely require a tough line, and
dependent on the political weather, involve lending support for the extension of the mandate of the current
investigation, or else the establishment of any further investigatory processes which the expected report calls for.
This alone isn’t enough, and it remains just one issue in a broader landscape, but right now it is one of the few
official processes we have and an opportunity which could easily be missed.
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